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ESSAY 
The Implications of Inequality for Fiscal 
Federalism (or Why the Federal Government 
Should Pay for Local Public Schools) 
BRIAN HIGHSMITH† 
ABSTRACT 
In designing public policy, a question of first principle is the 
degree to which government services—and the mechanisms of 
collecting revenue to finance those services—should be centralized 
within and across political systems. To inform their assessments of 
where redistribution should properly occur, public finance 
researchers have, to date, worked backwards from different 
assumptions about the mobility of residents within the political 
community. Scholars have disagreed about the viability of local 
governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth—with traditionalists 
arguing that these efforts are made impossible by residential 
mobility, and recent reformists countering that limitations on 
mobility indeed allow for limited redistribution at the local level. 
But these arguments have largely sidestepped questions about 
 
† Skadden Fellow, National Consumer Law Center. The author’s litigation and 
advocacy at NCLC aims to address the ways that contact with criminal 
punishment systems result in unaffordable financial obligations for low-income 
families—abuses driven by governments’ seeking to shift the costs of mass 
incarceration onto heavily-policed communities. Before law school, he worked on 
domestic economic policy, with a focus on federal tax and budget policy. For 
helpful feedback on the ideas in this Essay, he wishes to thank Professor David 
Schleicher, Urja Mittal, Michael Anthony George, and Robert Manduca. He also 
is grateful to the editors of the Buffalo Law Review. 
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what level of centralization is theoretically optimal for 
redistributive programs. And by focusing on the empirical question 
of residential mobility, they have ignored a variable that—I seek to 
demonstrate—is at least as important. In this Essay, I argue that 
those two deficiencies in the literature are connected. I introduce a 
simple model to show that economic redistribution becomes more 
difficult—indeed, approaches impossibility—as economic inequality 
increases, regardless of one’s assumptions about levels of mobility 
(by the rich or poor). That is because economic inequality has an 
inherent spatial dimension: so long as citizens exhibit anything 
short of perfect mobility (and perfect responsiveness to 
redistributive policy), its rise will result in an increasing geographic 
concentration of fiscal resources available to governments. For this 
reason, higher levels of economic inequality strengthen the case for 
centralizing the financing of any public good or program with 
redistributive goals—including the great bulk of what 
contemporary governments aim to do. 
I introduce the concept of a “fiscal unit” to refer to the geographic 
scope of public financing—which might be, depending on the 
program, a school district boundary, a county, a state, or the entire 
country. In order to achieve an equitable allocation of public goods, 
policymakers should respond to rising income inequality by shifting 
the site of revenue collection to occur at widely drawn “fiscal units”. 
This can take two forms. It can be done by expanding the scope of 
fiscal boundaries—for example, by funding locally-administered 
programs at the state or federal level. Alternatively, policymakers 
could respond to inequality by increasing fiscal transfers from 
higher levels of government (wider fiscal units) to lower, 
geographically smaller governments. 
Rather than an afterthought, the existing level of economic 
inequality within a political community may be the single most 
important question for this aspect of policy design. Where wealth is 
unequally distributed, the primary responsibility of assessing the 
revenues used to finance public goods should be assumed by levels 
of government representing the greatest number of people. This 
paper thus suggests that policymakers should respond to rising 
income inequality by shifting not only the burden but also the site 
of redistributive taxation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, American states, counties, and 
municipalities have undertaken aggressive efforts to shift 
the cost of operating their courts and criminal punishment 
systems onto heavily-policed communities. Facing political 
and economic pressures, they have constructed elaborate 
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systems to extract onerous payments from vulnerable 
families already living on the margins.1 As a result of these 
efforts, people who have contact with the criminal legal 
system are frequently left with unaffordable debts that 
create acute hardship for vulnerable families and extract 
wealth from poor communities. This injustice has many 
causes, but it is perpetuated by the fiscal policy decision to 
fund local courts locally—through revenue assessed from 
residents who are cycled through the legal system—rather 
than through redistributive taxes on sources of income and 
wealth, including from people and corporations outside the 
distressed communities that are targeted by law 
enforcement. As one recent report concluded, “many local 
governments have become more reliant on [revenues from 
fines and fees], in part because state financial support for 
municipal services has eroded . . . .”2 It is for this reason that 
many civil rights advocates fighting the imposition of court 
debt have organized around a call to fund judicial systems 
from general revenues collected at the state level.3 
A similar dynamic has resulted in sharp funding 
disparities across local school districts. Because American 
public schools receive, on average, around half of their 
funding from local tax revenues,4 schools in high-poverty 
 
 1. See Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-
Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1483, 1540 (2016) 
(“Rising expense in the criminal justice system and shrinking public budgets 
have resulted in a cost transfer from state and county courts to those arrested, 
indicted, and convicted, imposing a heavy burden of criminal justice debt on a 
largely indigent population.”). 
 2. Michael Leachman et al., Advancing Racial Equity With State Tax Policy, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 17 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org 
/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-15-18sfp.pdf. 
 3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
DEBT: A GUIDE FOR POLICY REFORM 12 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu 
/assets/Confronting-Crim-Justice-Debt-Guide-to-Policy-Reform-FINAL.pdf (“To 
avoid creating incentives for courts and localities to fund themselves based on 
criminal justice debt, the judicial system should be fully funded by the state.”). 
 4. PHYLLIS MCCLURE ET AL., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, ENSURING 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: HOW LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
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districts are persistently underfunded relative to their high-
income neighbors—despite those districts’ being tasked with 
educating more students in need of additional support than 
wealthier districts.5 In Pennsylvania, the highest poverty 
school districts spend 33 percent less educating their children 
than the wealthiest districts, entrenching opportunity 
disparities across communities within the state.6 America is 
thus one of only a handful of developed countries that allows 
the economies of local areas to determine the quality of 
schools in that area.7 
The American system of public schools, funded by local 
property taxes, was adopted by most states during the 19th 
century—a time during which, among white colonialists, 
“incomes were more equally distributed . . . than in any other 
place that can be measured.”8 As a result, “this system of 
using property taxes to pay for local schools did not [initially] 
lead to much inequality.”9 But as economic inequality 
increased, so did funding gaps between schools in rich and 
 
FUNDING PRACTICES HURT DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY 
CAN DO ABOUT IT, 1, (2008), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content 
/uploads/issues/2008/06/pdf/comparability.pdf (“Nationwide, local school districts 
account for about 50 percent of all public school operating costs.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, Good School, Rich School; Bad School, Poor 
School: The Inequality At The Heart Of America’s Education System, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08 
/property-taxes-and-unequal-schools/497333/. 
 6. Press Release, Secretary Duncan, Urban League President Morial to 
Spotlight States Where Education Funding Shortchanges Low-Income, Minority 
Students, https://www.ed.gov/news/media-advisories/secretary-duncan-urban-
league-president-morial-spotlight-states-where-education-funding-shortchanges 
-low-income -minority-students. 
 7. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2013: 
OECD INDICATORS, (2013), https://www.oecd.org/education/eag2013%20(eng)—
FINAL%2020%20June%202013.pdf. 
 8. PETER H. LINDERT & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, UNEQUAL GAINS: AMERICAN 
GROWTH AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1700 (2016). 
 9. See Semuels, supra note 5 (“In 1890, property taxes accounted for 67.9 
percent of public-education revenues in the U.S. This means that as America 
urbanized and industrialized and experienced more regional inequality, so, too, 
did the schools. Areas that had poorer families or less valuable land had less 
money for schools.” (emphasis in original)). 
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poor American communities.10 The size of district boundaries 
mattered significantly: states that funded their school 
systems at the local district level experienced greater 
difficulty equalizing funding, compared to those that funded 
districts at the (higher) county level.11 In an opinion 
dissenting from the Court’s rejection of constitutional 
challenge to this system, Justice Marshall observed that the 
resulting scheme “arbitrarily channels educational resources 
in accordance with the fortuity of the amount of taxable 
wealth within each district.”12 As a result of this design, 
“countless children unjustifiably receive inferior educations 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever 
to be undone.”13 
These examples illustrate the relationship between 
economic segregation and spatial constraints on 
governments’ ability to provide public goods of a 
redistributive nature. In this Essay, I develop a simple model 
that illustrates the ways that economic inequality increases 
the stakes of the boundary drawing exercise, with respect to 
the possibilities for redistribution. I introduce the concept of 
a “fiscal unit” to refer to the geographic scope of public 
financing—which might be, depending on the program, a 
school district boundary, a county, a state, or the entire 
country. I show that where financial transfers across fiscal 
units are limited—whether by political incentives or legal 
structures or some other constraint—the existence of 
enduring economic segregation places a ceiling on the policy 
goal of redistribution. Thus, in order to achieve a policy of 
effective redistribution, a political community facing high 
levels of economic inequality must either (1) expand the 
geographic scope of the fiscal unit such that it includes both 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 71–72 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). 
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the poor and the wealthy, or (2) transfer economic resources 
across fiscal units. 
Surprisingly, this relationship has not been explored in 
the theoretical fiscal federalism literature. As described in 
Part III infra, public finance scholars have theorized the 
viability of local governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth 
to be determined by residential mobility; they have largely 
overlooked the importance of economic inequality and 
resulting geographic concentrations of wealth.14 To inform 
their assessments of where redistribution might properly 
occur, public finance researchers have, to date, worked 
backward from different assumptions about the mobility of 
residents within the political community.15 Over decades, 
something of a consensus had formed among public finance 
scholars that high degrees of residential mobility will 
undercut—indeed, make near impossible—localities’ efforts 
to redistribute wealth. These orthodox models of 
decentralization argued that location-mobility limits the 
possibility of local redistribution because high-income people 
will exit—and that residential mobility thus serves as a 
disciplining measure for local governments. This view has 
been criticized in recent years, on the grounds that residents 
are not perfectly mobile, and thus—all else equal—local 
governments can engage in some amount of redistribution 
without risking the sort of “death spiral” predicted by 
previous scholars.16 
But both of these stories underemphasize—or altogether 
overlook—the existing level of resource inequality within the 
political community. This omission has limited the literature 
 
 14. See infra Part III for a discussion of how existing theoretical accounts 
unduly emphasize mobility and while overlooking the importance of economic 
inequality. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, 
and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057 (2007). See also infra Part III 
for a discussion of how the public finance scholarship has considered the viability 
of local governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth. 
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in important ways and led to curious results. For example, 
although the contours of the general framework have been 
contested at the margins, over the years the literature has 
generally coalesced around what Wallace Oates identified as 
the “basic principle of fiscal decentralization: the 
presumption that the provision of public services should be 
located at the lowest level of government encompassing, in a 
spatial sense, the relevant benefits and costs.”17 This is 
precisely the opposite recommendation as what results from 
the framework I introduce, at least where economic 
inequalities are pronounced. 
Indeed, this framework demonstrates that we don’t have 
to settle the empirical debate about location-mobility to 
ascertain the implications of economic inequality for fiscal 
federalism design. I show that in the presence of economic 
segregation, narrowly-drawn fiscal units will decrease the 
share of the population that is able to access the wealth held 
by the “superearners” (as my model terms the wealthiest 
few). For instance, district lines prevent taxes assessed from 
wealthy homeowners in Chester County, Pennsylvania, from 
funding school systems educating poor students in 
neighboring Philadelphia (the highest-poverty large city in 
America).18 I show that the case for centralizing mechanisms 
of revenue collection is strong, given the current distribution 
of economic resources across fiscal units. Additionally, I 
demonstrate that this recommendation is not contingent on 
any given level of mobility within a system. 
This finding is relevant today. Over the past several 
decades, income gains have accrued disproportionately to a 
 
 17. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 
1122 (1999); see also id. at 1120 (defining fiscal federalism as concerning itself 
with “understand[ing] which functions and instruments are best centralized and 
which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government”). 
 18. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHILADELPHIA’S POOR 1 (2017), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/11/pri_philadelphias_poor.pdf 
(“Poverty is one of Philadelphia’s most enduring problems. At 25.7 percent, the 
poverty rate is the highest among the nation’s 10 largest cities.”). 
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small number of extremely high-income individuals.19 Today, 
the richest 0.1 percent of Americans hold 22 percent of the 
country’s wealth—the same share held by the bottom 90 
percent of the population—a level not seen since the 1920s.20 
Indeed, few trends have received greater attention both in 
legal and economics literature as well as in our political 
discourse.21 But these two literatures—on the proper 
assignment of redistribution in a federalist system and the 
implications of rising economic inequality—have developed 
separately, and not often been connected. This Essay 
attempts to help close that gap. 
Public finance scholars have recognized that we should 
respond to rising income inequality by shifting the relative 
burden of taxation upward, through higher rates on 
superearners.22 This article suggests that this response is 
insufficient, provided that policymakers do not also shift the 
site of redistributive taxation. In particular, in order to 
achieve an efficient and equitable allocation of public goods, 
policymakers should respond to rising income inequality by 
shifting the site of taxation to higher levels of government. 
 
 19. For a review of these trends, see CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY, (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-
11pov_1.pdf (showing that households in the middle and lower parts of the 
income distribution have seen their income growth slow sharply, while incomes 
at the very top have experienced sharp growth). 
 20. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United 
States Since 1913: Evidence From Capitalized Income Tax Data 131 QUARTERLY 
J. ECON., 519, 520–21 (2016). 
 21. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks on the 
Economy (Dec. 4, 2013), in WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics 
/running-transcript-president-obamas-december-4-remarks-on-the-economy/201 
3/12/04/7cec31ba-5cff-11e3-be07-006c776266ed_story.html?utm_term=.3362a0a 
77d6d (last visited May 22, 2019) (referring to economic inequality as “the 
defining challenge of our time”). 
 22. See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income 
Taxation, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 391 (Alan J. Auerbach et al., eds. 
2013) (postulating that “for a given profile of social welfare weights . . . the higher 
the pre-tax inequality . . . the higher the optimal tax rate.”). 
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II. A BASIC MODEL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 
By definition, one consequence of economic inequality is 
that an increasing share of the country’s wealth is held by a 
small group of people, at the top of the income scale—a 
greater concentration of wealth among people. As inequality 
increases within a community, a greater share of its total 
economic resources will be held by a given share of its 
members. No logic is required to reach this result; it simply 
is one definition of inequality. Figure 1 presents a visual 
representation of this relationship. 
FIGURE 1. The Spatial Dimension of Economic Inequality* 
 
*Figure 1 is a graphical representation of outputs generated from a 
simple model of different distributions of wealth across an economy. As 
noted in the text, the size of the circles (the geometric area) corresponds 
to the amount of wealth held by representative households. The model 
and respective outputs are on file with the author. 
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In this Figure, as well as the others in this section, the 
size of the circles represents the amount of wealth held by 
members of the political community. I have plotted these 
figures such that the total wealth in the community (the 
summed area across all the circles) is held constant 
throughout all examples at 1,500 units, but wealth 
concentration varies across the twenty members of this 
community. I calculated the size of the different circles to 
match the levels of wealth concentration corresponding to 
various Gini coefficients, the most common measure of 
inequality.23 
A. Rising Inequality Results in a Higher Geographic 
Concentration of Wealth 
Figure 1 visually depicts what happens as wealth 
becomes increasingly concentrated—moving here from 
perfect equality, to the level of actual concentration of 2013 
market incomes in the U.S.24, to an illustrative extreme level 
of inequality. In the “extreme inequality” scenario, used 
throughout this section, a single “superearner”—one of 
twenty in the community, and thus the top 5 percent—holds 
90 percent of total wealth for comparison, the top 10 percent 
of Americans held 77 percent of the country’s wealth in 2012, 
according to estimates by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel 
Zucman.25 
The advantage of this visual representation is that it 
shows the spatial dimension of economic inequality. 
Whatever other effects inequality might have on a political 
community, it is clear—indeed, it is mathematically true—
that one consequence of rising inequality is a geographic 
 
 23. See generally Robert Dorfman, A Formula for the Gini Coefficent, 61 REV. 
ECON & STAT.146 (1979). 
 24. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
FEDERAL TAXES, 2013 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-
congress-2015-2016/reports/51361-householdincomefedtaxes.pdf. 
 25. Saez & Zucman, supra note 20, at 520–21. 
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concentration of wealth.26 This relationship was recently 
noted by sociologist Robert Manduca: “Because people live in 
places, and because people are distributed unevenly across 
places with respect to income or any other social 
characteristic, changes in the distribution of income among 
people will necessarily change the distribution of income 
across places.”27 This insight has public finance implications, 
for one simple reason: at least with respect to income taxes, 
people are indivisible—each dollar they earn is generally 
subject to income taxation only once per level of government, 
based on location at a moment in time (either of the income 
source or geographic domicile).28 Although these 
superearners’ consumption choices are not bound to a 
specific geographic area—and the cumulative economic 
effects of inequality are thus uncertain with respect to 
geography (though certainly biased in the direction of 
concentration)—it is possible to make a clear statement 
about the spatial dimension of economic inequality for the 
purpose of person-based taxation. Rising economic inequality 
necessarily results in a higher degree of geographic 
clustering of fiscal resources, particularly as assessed 
through person-based taxes. 
The implications of this simple observation are 
particularly notable in light of recent economic trends. After 
all, these extremely wealthy individuals are mostly located 
in a handful of locations, rather than distributed across the 
country—and thus are outside the reach for many local 
jurisdictions in an inevitable geographic sense. Further, 
 
 26. As explained below, this is different from economic segregation, which 
follows from wealth concentration only under certain mobility assumptions. 
 27. Robert Manduca, The Contribution of National Income Inequality to 
Regional Economic Divergence, 97 SOC. FORCES 1, 7 (2019). 
 28. Although this is true as a matter of aspirational tax policy (so as to avoid 
taxing the same income multiple times), jurisdictions take different approaches 
to taxing different types of income, and the legal reality can be somewhat more 
complicated. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Residence for Income Tax 
Purposes: Domicile as Gap-Filler, Citizenship as Proxy and Gap-Filler, 38 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 271 (2017). 
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these superearners are perceived by policymakers to be 
highly mobile, and thus difficult for state and especially local 
governments to tax—meaning that their wealth stands 
outside these governments’ reach in an important practical 
sense.29 Their perceived potential flight risk makes it more 
“expensive” for local and state governments, compared to the 
federal government, to raise from them a given dollar in 
revenue.30 
B. Defining the Fiscal Unit 
The presence of fiscal boundaries introduces a new layer 
to this story. Most state expenditures involve some element 
of what we can describe as redistribution: instances of state 
spending where the group of individuals who pay for the good 
or service does not entirely and exhaustively overlap with the 
user group. Where a state endeavors to pay for a publicly 
provided good or service, the group of individuals from whom 
these revenues are collected can be thought of as constituting 
the “fiscal unit” for that category of spending. Fiscal units, as 
I use the term here, are thus defined in reference to the 
financers rather than the users of the good, in the cases 
where redistribution occurs and those two groups are 
distinct. 
Although there are many ways for a state to limit this 
universe of financers, the scope of a fiscal unit can always be 
 
 29. See, e.g., Charles Varner & Cristobal Young, Millionaire Migration in 
California: The Impact of Top Rates, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 255 (2011); Enrico Moretti 
& Daniel Wilson, The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of Top 
Earners: The Case of Star Scientists, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1858, (2017). But see 
Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite: Evidence 
from Administrative Data, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 421 (2016), (concluding, based on a 
review of tax returns for all million-dollar earners nationwide over 13 years, that 
“Millionaire tax flight is occurring, but only at the margins of statistical and 
socioeconomic significance”). 
 30. This is because residential mobility effectively increases the elasticity of 
reported taxable income, and thus also the economic “cost” of raising taxes. Cf. 
Jon Gruber and Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and 
Implications, 84 J. PUB. ECON., 1, 22 (2002). 
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defined in reference to some geographic boundary—typically 
coincident to some political community (eligible residents of 
a particular unit of government).31 These political 
communities tend to overlap in concentric circles, where 
higher levels of government share a common geography with 
multiple smaller, subsidiary units. Theories of fiscal 
federalism—which typically are discussed in terms of level of 
government—can therefore also be thought of as arguments 
about how broad, in a spatial sense (and more precisely, in 
terms of population size), fiscal units should be defined.32 
It is important to note here that although this analysis 
focuses on the spatial component of inequality, the size of 
these “fiscal units” is defined not in reference to landmass, 
but rather to the number of people occupying the space. A 
“small” fiscal unit may be quite large in terms of geography, 
if its vast space includes only few people. This highlights one 
key analytic advantage of using the fiscal unit as our mode 
of analysis: under a traditional consideration of federalism, 
South Dakota (population 850,000) occupies a level higher 
than Los Angeles (3,900,000) and equal to California 
(39,000,000). In this model, by contrast, the fiscal units 
would be arranged in reference to population size within a 
geographic space, rather than to the size of the landmass. 
Accordingly, it may be the case—supported by the theory laid 
out here—that the city of Los Angeles is better able to 
support redistributive functions than the state of South 
Dakota. Unlike other models of federalism, the units in this 
model are defined in reference to the size of governed 
populations—rather than to the level of government in a 
political sense, or to the size of the geographic landmass. 
 
 31. That is, a state may limit the universe of financers by, for example, 
assessing taxes only on a certain type of income or property—but these categories 
will always be defined relative to some geographic boundary. 
 32. Others have drawn a similar distinction between the level of government. 
See Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government Finance, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1837 n.34 (2017) (“These other critiques have tended to focus 
not on what level of government should pay for local services but rather the size 
of the jurisdiction that should spend the money and regulate local affairs.”). 
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One analytic contribution of this framework is thus to 
shift away from centralization debate, which refers to the 
proper level of government at which functions should be 
provided and paid for, and towards the size of the fiscal unit. 
This will often map onto centralization, because states will 
tend to be larger than local governments (both of which will 
always be smaller than the federal government)—but the 
two measures are not the same. This has two additional 
benefits for the purpose of this discussion. As described 
further below, defining the fiscal unit this way anticipates 
and accounts for an important objection: if the fiscal unit is 
defined with respect to landmass, then geographic mobility 
adds a new variable that must be accounted for. This 
definition allows us to discuss the size of fiscal boundaries 
without considering mobility, since residential exit and entry 
will—on its own—change the size of the fiscal unit. Second, 
the distinction between geography and population size 
allows for a more productive discussion because it allows you 
to draw conclusions, and make policy recommendations, 
without getting lost in some of the ancillary federalism 
debates that are less relevant here. 
C. Geographic Wealth Concentration Increases the Stakes of 
Fiscal Boundaries 
In the absence of perfect mobility, greater economic 
concentration across physical spaces necessarily follows from 
rising income concentration. Where economic resources are 
unevenly distributed across geography, the spatial definition 
of fiscal units takes on greater significance. To the extent 
that financial transfers across fiscal units are limited—
whether by political incentives or legal structures or some 
other constraint—the existence of enduring economic 
segregation places a ceiling on the policy goal of 
redistribution. In the presence of economic segregation, 
drawing fiscal units narrowly will decrease the share of the 
population that is able to access the wealth held by the 
superearners. And when economic inequality is rising, that 
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wealth will constitute a growing share of the polity’s total 
resources. Economic inequality thus raises the stakes of 
“fiscal splintering” for redistributive outcomes and 
possibilities. 
This can be seen in Figure 2, which takes two of the 
wealth distributions presented in Figure 1 and introduces 
illustrative fiscal boundaries. The two scenarios in this 
Figure represent the extremes of wealth distribution: where 
wealth is distributed equally across members of the political 
community, and where it is highly concentrated at the top 
(represented here by a single superearner). 
In communities where wealth is equally distributed, it 
makes little difference for the purposes of redistribution how 
many “fiscal units” are drawn, or how you draw those lines.33 
The Figure varies the population size across the four fiscal 
units, but—on a per capita basis—each community has the 
same resources, even though total wealth in the communities 
changes. Here, the redistributive stakes of the boundary 
drawing exercise are low.34 But in the second scenario, where 
there is extreme inequality, the size and boundaries of the 
fiscal unit matter tremendously. Ninety-three percent of 
wealth in the political community is held by the 30 percent 
of the population that resides in Unit A; absent inter-unit 
transfers, the 70 percent of community members (in Units B, 
C, and D) must fund their public goods from the remaining 7 
percent of economic resources. 
The population that continues to live in the remaining, 
 
 33. This sets aside the reality that many redistributive public goods 
(especially those taking forms other than pure cash transfers) involve economies 
of scale or fixed costs. Schools are a classic example of this sort of mixed public 
good; local court systems are another. Where scale matters, then the size of the 
fiscal unit will have consequences even in the world where economic resources 
are distributed equally across community members. As Zachary Liscow has 
pointed out, this argument pertains more to centralized spending rather than 
centralized funding. See id. at 1830 n.3. 
 34. Of course, the fact that wealth is equally distributed on a market basis 
defeats the policy purpose for purely redistributive programs, but this basic 
dynamic holds true also where slight wealth variations are introduced. 
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resource-poor fiscal units will be unable to access the 
superearners’ wealth for inter-unit redistribution. If the 
dimensions of the polity’s fiscal units do not correspondingly 
expand, then this sort of fiscal enclaving will thus have the 
effect of shrinking the share of total resources available to 
fund government functions serving those who does not co-
occupy one of the resource-rich units. Absent inter-unit 
transfers, it follows that the population that lives in the “left 
behind” jurisdictions will be made worse-off (in an economic 
sense) by fiscal splintering. Indeed, in this extreme example, 
redistribution to these left behind community members is 
impossible without some centrally coordinated transfer of 
financial resources across fiscal units. As inequality rises, 
the world necessarily will look more like the second scenario. 
FIGURE 2. Economic Inequality Raises the Stakes of Fiscal 
Boundaries*,a 
 
*Figure 2 is a graphical representation of outputs generated by the model 
utilized for Figure 1 above. The model and outputs are on file with the author. 
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aGraphical representation of wealth in a system of: 1) perfect equality wherein 
each of the twenty circles represents 75 units for a total of 1,500 wealth units, 
and 2) extreme inequality wherein each of the nineteen small circle represents 
8 units and the large circle represents 1,348 units, for a total of 1,500 wealth 
units. 
D. Effect on different groups 
The effect of fiscal boundaries here varies across 
members of the community, depending on whether they co-
occupy the fiscal unit with the superearner. Indeed, it is 
worth noting that—so long as the total amount of 
redistribution is held constant—fiscal splintering creates 
winners as well as losers. The poor families who live in the 
same fiscal unit as the superearners (Unit A in this model) 
now may enjoy the benefit of these resources without sharing 
with those other poor families who remain outside the unit. 
The effect of this is to increase their incomes, post tax and 
transfers, to above the level that it would be absent either 
redistribution or fiscal boundaries. 
The departing fortunes of these two groups of poor 
community members—introduced by the fiscal boundaries 
(and based on proximity to the superearner)—highlights an 
additional notable relationship. This framework establishes 
that, where economic segregation is present, drawing 
subnational fiscal boundaries limits the possibilities of 
redistribution (absent inter-unit transfers). Figure 3 
highlights an important conclusion: the presence of fiscal 
boundaries will tend to result in greater inequality after 
transfers, compared to a world where the fiscal unit is 
maximally large and redistribution is undertaken centrally. 
Where initial fiscal resources are unequally distributed 
across a political community, fiscal boundaries will have the 
effect of limiting redistribution; over time, this will have the 
effect of increasing inequality compared to a world where 
redistribution occurs centrally. Stated differently: as long as 
there are some individuals who are “walled-off” from the 
wealth of the superearners (which will be true so long as 
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mobility is anywhere short of perfect, as described below), 
and the total level of redistribution is held constant, then 
narrowly-drawn fiscal units have the effect of increasing 
after-transfer inequality. This is illustrated in Figure 3, 
which shows the effect of fiscal boundaries on three different 
conceptual categories of community members: the 
superearners (described above, and shown in black); the 
“hangers-on” (the poor members who co-occupy Unit A with 
the superearner and may thus receive benefits financed by 
their wealth, in dark gray); and the “left-behinds” (the poor 
members in the remaining fiscal units, in light gray). 
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FIGURE 3. Effect of Fiscal Boundaries on Different Groups 
Amid Conditions of High Inequality 
 
*Figure 3 is a graphical representation of outputs generated from the model utilized 
for Figures 1 and 2 above. The model and outputs are on file with the author. 
aWealth (area) of Left-Behinds: 8 (light gray); Hangers-On: 8 (gray); Superearners: 
1,348 (Black). Gini coefficient: 0.85. 
bWealth (area) of Left-Behinds: 8 (light gray); Hangers-On: 142 (gray); 
Superearners: 946 (Black). Gini coefficient: 0.80. 
cWealth (area) of Left-Behinds: 35 (light gray); Hangers-On: 35 (gray); 
Superearners: 839 (Black). Gini coefficient: 0.51 
To produce this Figure, I introduce a simple tax and 
transfer system to the extreme inequality scenario described 
above. Specifically, I set a flat tax—assessed on every 
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member in the political community, without regard to their 
fiscal unit—at 40 percent of economic resources. The entirety 
of the collected is then redistributed back to members in the 
form of a flat lump sum payment (akin to a universal basic 
income), the amount of which is calculated so as to be equal 
across members of the fiscal unit. I then recalculate wealth, 
inclusive of these taxes and transfers. Stated differently, the 
model extracts a flat-rate tax from every member in the 
political community, but the proceeds are collected and 
redistributed within the boundaries of the different fiscal 
units.35 
The first scenario shows the market distribution of 
income, prior to tax and transfers; the next two scenarios 
show the effect of the redistributive tax and transfer system 
with and without centralized redistribution, achieved here 
through inter-unit transfers. Because eligibility for the 
transfer payments is determined centrally, the effect of the 
inter-unit transfers is identical to a scenario where a single 
fiscal unit is drawn to include the entire political community. 
Provided that the total amount of redistribution is held 
constant and the entirety of the resource is distributed 
without respect to unit domicile, then—at least 
economically—the effect is equivalent to expanding the fiscal 
boundary, since you are able to achieve the same 
redistribution.36 Held constant in this model are total 
wealth, the total amount of redistribution (determined by the 
tax rate), and residential location (perfect absence of 
mobility).37 
 
 35. In this model, the government operates a purely redistributive cash 
transfer system, involving no economies of scale. The focus here so far has been 
on pure cash transfers, as they are conceptually easiest to conceive and also most 
straightforward to show in a model. Introducing impure or fixed cost public goods 
would change the numbers, but not the direction of the relationship. 
 36. Indeed, this is Liscow’s primary policy recommendation. See Liscow, 
supra note 32, at 1897 (“[T]his Article’s most direct policy implication is that it 
strengthens on efficiency grounds the case for more centralized funding of the 
costs of providing services in poor localities.”). 
 37. Mobility is discussed further below, but it is worth noting here that under 
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As shown in Figure 3, the presence of fiscal boundaries 
significantly limits the effectiveness of the government’s 
redistributive policy. Where the redistribution scheme is 
centralized (here through inter-unit transfers to Units B, C, 
and D), the Gini coefficient falls from 0.85 to 0.51—a 40 
percent reduction. Where redistribution occurs only within 
the different fiscal units, the Gini coefficient falls only 6 
percent, to 0.8. Both the superearners and the hangers-on do 
better in this scenario. The hangers-on receive significantly 
higher transfers, and therefore come out much further ahead 
after redistribution; although in both scenarios the 
superearners pay more in taxes than they receive back in 
benefits, they also receive higher transfers and are thus 
better off when redistribution is localized. But the left-
behinds, who make up 80 percent of the total population, are 
significantly worse off without the inter-unit transfers. The 
effect of fiscal boundaries here is to reduce the redistributive 
transfers to the left-behinds and increase the transfers to the 
hangers-on. The effect of this is to dull the impact of the 
redistributive program and increase total inequality, 
compared to a world where redistribution is carried out 
centrally. This is true even though there are winners and 
losers, even among the non-superearners. 
This basic dynamic has been observed before. Forty 
years ago, Richard Musgrave noted that geographic 
inequality would tend to have this effect over time: “The fact 
that High Town has a higher average income than Low Town 
means that local provision of social goods will tend to 
increase inequality among the total population, including 
residents of both towns.”38 Political scientist George Tsebelis 
made a similar observation, arguing that “federalism is 
likely [to] increase inequalities [because] some transfer 
 
the traditional models of fiscal federalism introduced above, the case for local 
redistribution is strongest where—as here, under the assumptions of this model—
citizens do not move in response to varying redistributive outcomes. 
 38. Richard A. Musgrave, Economics of Fiscal Federalism, 10 NEB. J. ECON & 
BUS. 3, 8 (1971). 
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payments are restricted within states . . . [and so where] the 
federation includes rich and poor states, transfers from the 
former to the latter are reduced compared to a unitary 
state.”39 
Moreover, as explained below, it has been widely 
observed that a primary implication of our decentralized 
school finance structure is to codify, and perhaps reinforce, 
existing economic inequalities across local school districts.40 
Although this dynamic has been recognized in the context of 
public education, this relationship—between static economic 
segregation and the proper assignment of redistribution in 
federalist systems—has been under-theorized. In particular, 
while the public finance literature has extensively covered 
the relationship between mobility and redistributive 
assignment, the implications of rising inequality have 
received considerably less attention.41 And although local 
school systems may be the most obvious example, this 
framework demonstrates there is no reason to believe that 
the basic dynamic or relationship is not present wherever 
state or local governments endeavor to provide redistributive 
public goods. 
III. EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF FISCAL FEDERAL UNDULY 
EMPHASIZE MOBILITY WHILE IGNORING INEQUALITY 
Public finance scholars have long debated the degree to 
which government services—and the mechanisms of 
collecting revenue to finance those services—should be 
 
 39. GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 89 
(2002). See also, Jason Sorens, Does Fiscal Federalism Promote Regional 
Inequality? An Empirical Analysis of the OECD, 1980–2005, 48 REGIONAL STUD. 
239, 240 (2014) (“Some public finance economists argue that [preexisting] 
inequalities widen over time in fiscally federal systems, as rich regions can 
provide more public goods at lower cost per unit of income than poorer regions.”). 
 40. See generally Liscow, supra note 32. 
 41. Liscow is an important exception. See id. at 1837–38 (discussing the 
implications of rising income inequality, and in particular differences in wealth 
between cities and suburbs, for local school finances). 
2019] IMPLICATIONS OF INEQUALITY 429 
centralized within and across political systems. To inform 
their assessments of where redistribution properly should 
occur, public finance researchers have to date worked 
backwards from different assumptions about the mobility of 
residents within the political community. But these 
theoretical arguments, recounted in this section, have 
largely sidestepped questions about what level of 
centralization is optimal for redistributive programs—and 
have focused on empirical questions about residents’ 
location-mobility and responsiveness to redistribution. 
Researchers have worked backwards from different mobility 
assumptions to inform their assessments of where 
redistribution properly should occur—largely ignoring the 
dynamics described in the above framework. 
This Section recounts those debates, and shows that 
those discussions are incomplete without reference to the 
degree of economic concentration within the community. 
This omission is no small matter, because the leading 
principle of fiscal federal embodies the opposite 
recommendation of what results from the above framework 
that centers inequality. Even though scholars have focused 
on mobility, I show that the dynamic presents itself so long 
as citizens exhibit anything short of perfect mobility (and 
perfect responsiveness to redistributive policy). 
A. The Long Shadow of Charles Tiebout 
Like so many debates in the fiscal federalism literature, 
the dividing lines in this one can be traced back to Charles 
Tiebout’s famous theory of location decisions and public 
services.42 His model has provided normative justification for 
two relevant policy recommendations. First, its logic 
supports a policy of dividing political jurisdictions into 
 
 42. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956) (arguing that, under certain assumptions, people’s choice of 
residences could function as a way of choosing among public goods, akin to the 
way the market allows them to choose among private goods). 
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numerous—and therefore, at least on average, small—local 
governments, to ensure this marketplace of governments 
from which citizen-consumers might choose is sufficiently 
large.43 Second, Tiebout’s analysis has been used to argue for 
entrusting these many local governments with significant 
authority over the provision of public goods, to ensure that 
the choices provided this large marketplace are sufficiently 
diverse. Together, these recommendations support a general 
policy of decentralized service provision—at least with 
respect to the class of goods and services to which Tiebout’s 
logic can be cleanly applied.44 
But how broad should this category of goods be defined? 
Wherever the state provides a good or service to the public 
that incurs a budgetary cost, it must raise revenue to finance 
the expense, either concurrently or in the future.45 Some 
state-provided goods and services are financed through a 
user-fee model, where the individual who pays for an 
unsubsidized good is also its exclusive user. But the 
overwhelming bulk of a state’s budget items involve some 
element of redistribution, in the broadest sense of the term: 
state spending where the group of individuals who pay for 
the good or service do not entirely and exhaustively overlap 
with the user group. For many public expenditures, namely 
 
 43. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1507, 1508–09 (2010) (“The normative takeaway from the Tiebout model 
literature is clear: metropolitan regions should be divided into many local 
governments that are free to provide local public services in an unrestricted way, 
as this will ensure that mobile citizens receive their desired package of public 
services.”). 
 44. See Liscow, supra note 32, at 1836 (“The model’s supporters have 
generally argued for decentralized provision of services, and its critics have 
generally argued for more centralized provision.”); Oates, supra note 17, at 1124 
(“I sense a widespread impression, suggested in some of the literature, that the 
gains from decentralization have their source in the famous Tiebout model”). 
 45. Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You 
Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 378 (2004) (“When a 
local government decides to provide a service, improve or construct 
infrastructure, or regulate private activity, the question of how to pay will 
generally be an important consideration.”). 
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cash transfer programs, achieving this redistribution is the 
first-order goal; for other types of expenditures, including so-
called “mixed” or “impure” public goods, any redistribution 
that occurs is incident to other policy goals. But it 
nevertheless does occur: incidence of the expenditure’s 
benefits does not perfectly match the incidence of the 
corresponding collected revenue. 
Tiebout identified mobility, and the disciplining 
pressures it created for cities, as the market-like mechanism 
by which local public goods could be efficiently provided by 
local governments. Although the assumptions underlying his 
original model are widely recognized as rarely-encountered 
simplifications, they are thought to most closely approximate 
real-world dynamics with respect to the (narrow) class of 
goods that can be funded and enjoyed by the same group of 
residents.46 For this reason, scholars have often 
distinguished in their assessments between different types 
of public goods—in particular between purely “local” goods 
and those that are fundamentally redistributive in nature.47 
B. Assignment of Redistribution: The Orthodox View 
Depending on empirical assumptions and normative 
emphasis, economists have diverged somewhat on the proper 
assignment of purely—or at least predominately—local 
government functions.48 Perhaps more precisely, they have 
 
 46. Indeed, one of the key contributions of Tiebout’s model was to demonstrate 
the existence of this class of “local public goods,” for which a mechanism could 
exist whereby decentralized provision could result in a Pareto-efficient outcome. 
Prior to the publication of his article, the public finance literature had generally 
accepted that decentralized choice could not result in an efficient provision of 
public goods. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388 (1954). 
 47. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five 
Years After Tiebout: A Perspective (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 954, 1982) https://www.nber.org/papers/w0954.pdf. 
 48. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal 
Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 352 (2005) (“Decentralized levels of 
government found their primary role in the provision of efficient levels of “local” 
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tended to divide on the question of how broadly or narrowly 
these categories should properly be defined—particularly 
considering that, as noted, almost all government functions 
provide some spillover benefits that are “uncaptured” by the 
financing population, and thus some element of 
redistribution.49 
With respect to redistributive goods, something of a 
consensus has emerged in the public finance literature: these 
functions ought to be assigned to the central level of 
government.50 In this literature, redistribution has been 
 
public goods—that is, public goods whose consumption was limited primarily to 
their own constituencies.”); Laura Levaggi & Rosella Levaggi, Devolution And 
Grant-In-Aid Design For The Provision Of Impure Public Goods, 5 SPRINGERPLUS 
1, 1 (2016) (“Traditional fiscal federalism theory postulates that devolution for 
the provision of local public goods increases welfare. However, most of the 
services offered at local level are local impure public goods whose characteristics 
may prevent devolution from being efficient.”). But see, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, 
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and 
Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1995) (arguing that service 
decentralization, as a general policy, limits intrusive tendencies of the public 
sector and supports the effective operation of private markets). 
 49. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 25–26 (1998) 
(“[Cities] provide services—like police, fire, sanitation, and education—that not 
only can be allocated to some people at the expense of others but often are. As a 
result, the theory of public goods, when applied to local governments, largely 
consists of arguments about whether, and to what extent, it is efficient for cities 
to supply these kinds of ‘mixed’ or ‘impure’ public goods.”); Levaggi & Levaggi, 
supra note 48, at 2 (“The traditional literature on fiscal federalism . . . argue[s] 
that the allocation of functions between Central and local Governments should 
follow efficiency principles. Production should be assigned to the tier which is 
better informed on local preferences, while Central Government . . . may use 
grants for equity and efficiency reasons.”); John R. Brooks, Fiscal Federalism as 
Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of Redistributive Taxation 68 TAX L. REV. 89, 
110 (2014) (“Another key result of classic fiscal federalism theory is that local 
public goods defined spatially . . . can be most efficiently provided by the 
government whose political lines lie most close to the spatial dimension for the 
local public good, all else equal.”); Oates, supra note 17, at 1121 (“Decentralized 
levels of government have their raison d’etre in the provision of goods and services 
whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions.”). 
 50. See Brooks, supra note 49, at 110 (“The standard view in the literature is 
that redistribution . . . should be exclusively allocated to the most central level of 
government—at the federal level, in the United States—with subnational 
governments focusing more on allocation of public goods and raising revenue from 
flatter and more stable taxes, such as a real property tax.”). See also Richard A. 
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defined broadly—generally assuming some transfer across 
income groups, but frequently emphasizing the spatial 
components of the task.51 As John Brooks has described, this 
theoretical consensus attaches to both the expenditure and 
revenue side: “[R]edistribution, and the closely related 
progressive income tax, should be assigned exclusively to the 
most central level of government in a federal system, leaving 
subnational governments to focus on allocation of public 
goods, funded with taxes tied closely to benefits.”52 
Indeed, this is frequently presented not as a policy 
recommendation but rather as a sort of natural rule, based 
on the implications of the same disciplining forces of mobility 
and citizen-as-consumer behavior that Tiebout identified.53 
The idea is that the mobility of economic units constrains 
local governments in their attempts to redistribute income in 
a way that does not similarly limit higher levels of 
government.54 Should a local government attempt to provide 
 
Musgrave, Economics of Fiscal Federalism, 10 NEB. J. ECON. & BUS. 3, 10 (1971) 
(“Adjustments in the distribution of income should be the responsibility of central 
policy, since it is only here that such measures can be conducted effectively and 
without causing severe efficiency losses.”); Micheael Keen & David E. Wildasin, 
Pareto Efficiency in International Taxation 15 (Ctr. For Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst., 
Working Paper No. 371, 2000) (arguing that under certain assumptions, it will 
be Pareto-improving for the national authority to subsidize local redistribution). 
But see David E. Wildasin, Locational Efficiency in a Federal System, 10 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 453, 461 (1980) (“[T]he demonstration that local tax 
systems are not ideally efficient is not a demonstration of the need for central 
government intervention—for example, in the form of inter-jurisdictional 
equalizing grants, as suggested by numerous writers. For such intervention is 
liable to introduce its own distortions and costs, and these must be weighted 
against the defects of the existing system.”). 
 51. See Musgrave, supra note 50, at 4 (“The spatial incidence of social goods 
differs. They may thus be arranged depending on whether their benefit incidence 
is local, statewide, regional, or national.”). 
 52. Brooks, supra note 49, at 89. 
 53. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 417 (1956). 
 54. See Gillette, supra note 16, at 1059 (“Redistributive exactions, the theory 
goes, should be the exclusive domain of more centralized jurisdictions—state and 
federal governments—from which taxpayers cannot easily exit without 
simultaneously giving up jobs, friends, or lifestyle.”). 
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any significant support of low-income households, it is 
theorized, this choice is likely to result in both 1) an influx of 
poor residents seeking to avail themselves of the generous 
benefits, risking the transformation of redistributive 
localities into “welfare magnets,”55 and 2) an exodus of those 
with higher incomes, who must then bear the corresponding 
tax burden.56 
In an early and influential formulation of this view, 
James Buchanan described each resident of a metropolitan 
area as representing some net value to his or her 
community.57 The existence of local redistribution, he 
argued, drives a wedge between residents’ contributions and 
their “costs”: those that would pay more taxes than they 
would use in services would have a positive net value, while 
those with lower incomes and higher service needs would 
have a net cost to their community.58 
Buchanan predicted municipalities that did not make 
focused efforts to retain profitable residents—and make 
 
 55. See id., at 1057, 1059 (describing and providing examples of this 
literature). 
 56. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 49, at 111 (“States with significant 
redistributive policies may become unattractive to higher-earning individuals 
and correspondingly more attractive to lower-earning individuals. If taxpayers 
are highly mobile within a nation, this could be costly to such a state, since the 
state would prefer the reverse—to be attractive to high-earning individuals, 
rather than low-earning individuals.”) Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, 
Assistance To The Poor In A Federal System, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 317 (1987) 
(arguing that local redistribution will tend to attract poor from other jurisdictions 
and thus increase the local price of redistribution). 
 57. James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 
1, 13 (1971). See also Gillette, supra note 16, at 1070 (“[T]he underlying theory is 
that local residents and firms can too easily escape redistributive burdens by 
emigrating to localities that impose only benefit taxes. Emigrants are likely to be 
the relatively wealthy, who bear a disproportionate share of the redistributive 
burden and thus have incentives to find alternative residence. As they exit, the 
redistributive burden falls increasingly on those who remain, heightening 
incentives for them to emigrate as well. Simultaneously, the promise of 
redistribution attracts more beneficiaries from outside the locality, creating 
greater demand for the benefits of redistribution.”). 
 58. Buchanan, supra note 57, at4–5, 12. 
2019] IMPLICATIONS OF INEQUALITY 435 
themselves unattractive to net service consumers—could 
easily fall into something of a death spiral.59 They would 
have to raise tax rates to pay for their service shortfalls, 
thereby driving away the mobile net taxpayers; this exodus 
would aggravate the fiscal shortfall and force further tax 
hikes, in turn driving away still more higher-income 
residents.60 As Michelle Wilde Anderson has documented, 
there are many examples of this dynamic playing out much 
as predicted in recent decades.61 Where core cities or older 
suburbs continued to have disproportionate low-income 
populations, the gap between service costs and available 
revenues has often to a vicious cycle of ever-greater service 
cuts followed by further out-migrations and revenue 
deterioration requiring further service cuts. 
Even those who have not gone so far prescriptively have 
generally argued that mobility of individuals with higher 
income makes significant redistribution at the local level 
difficult—or even impossible—to achieve, at least as a 
practical matter.62 The strong version of this argument is 
summarized by Clayton Gillette: 
The basis of that orthodoxy, derived from standard theories of fiscal 
federalism and urban economics, is straightforward: Local 
governments cannot successfully or efficiently redistribute wealth. 
That conclusion is predicated on a simple and compelling premise. 
Residents and firms that bear the burden of local redistribution can 
too easily exit to neighboring jurisdictions that impose only benefit-
based taxes of the sort that underwrite goods and services for 
taxpayers themselves. Mobile residents who escape redistributive 
taxes impose a greater redistributive burden on those who remain, 
inducing them to follow suit in a continuing downward spiral.63 
An early form of this absolute conclusion is provided by 
 
 59. See id. at 1, 12, 14. 
 60. See id. at 4–5. 
 61. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 
1118, 1145–48 (2014). 
 62. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 189–204 (2003). 
 63. Gillette, supra note 16, at 1058 (emphasis added). 
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Musgrave, who argued—based on the implications of 
residential mobility—that “[p]olicies to adjust the 
distribution of income among individuals must be conducted 
on a nationwide basis.”64 Richard Briffault has argued that 
local financial control may have the effect of reinforcing the 
consequences of initial inequalities across regions by 
creating a “centrifugal force,” due to the sort of competitive 
pressures described by Buchanan.65 
The development of this orthodoxy can be observed in the 
debate within the economics literature. In an early 
contribution, Mark Pauly argued that the assignment of 
redistribution to the local level allows polities to vary levels 
of redistribution across regions, and thus—where political 
preferences for redistribution vary across geographies—can 
promote efficiency.66 His work called for redistribution to be 
carried out at the local level wherever local governments are 
better able to express these diverse preferences for 
redistribution, which could occur under his model. This 
result can be thought of as one application of the general 
principle Oates identified, which Gillette also uses to support 
his argument for local redistribution.67 But economists 
 
 64. Musgrave, supra note 50 at 7. See also id. (“Progressive income taxation 
at the upper as well as transfers at the lower end of the scale—if substantial in 
scope—must be uniform within the entire area over which there is a high degree 
of capital and labor mobility, which means they have to be a function of the 
national government.”). 
 65. Specifically, he predicts efforts by the affluent to physically segregate 
themselves from the less affluent, to deploy local land use powers to heighten the 
barriers to local economic integration, and to incorporate separately so as to 
protect their local wealth and immunize local taxpayers from regional fiscal 
needs and demands. See Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School 
Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 805–06 (1992). 
 66. See Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. 
PUB. ECON. 35, 36–37 (1973). 
 67. See Oates, supra note 17, at 1122 (“The efficient level of output of a ‘local’ 
public good . . . is likely to vary across jurisdictions as a result of both differences 
in preferences and cost differentials. To maximize overall social welfare thus 
requires that local outputs vary accordingly.”); Gillette, supra note 16, at 1065 
(“If . . . preferences for redistribution are heterogeneous, local programs would 
allow a larger number of individuals to satisfy their preferences for a specific level 
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Burbidge and Meyers later argued that, once certain of 
Pauly’s assumptions are relaxed, diverse preferences for 
redistribution may lead to unequal residence-based taxation 
and thus actually undermine economic efficiency—that “the 
price of local expression of diverse preferences for 
redistribution may be inefficiency.”68 
A number of scholars have identified practical or political 
considerations—for example, the implications of legal 
structures that exist at the state and local level, including 
balanced budget requirements and constitutional tax and 
expenditure limitations—that function as additional 
constraints on local governments’ ability to redistribute 
effectively.69 Still others have rejected Tiebout’s analytic 
framework on normative grounds, arguing that local 
governments should advance democratic values by 
accommodating citizens’ need “to participate actively in the 
basic societal decisions that affect one’s life.”70 
C. Assignment of Redistribution: Recent Reconsiderations 
But the shadow of Tiebout remains long in this 
literature, both descriptively and for its normative 
implications. Against this backdrop, several legal scholars 
have pointed out that—despite theoretical arguments 
predicting that redistribution can take place only centrally—
 
of redistribution.”). 
 68. John B. Burbidge & Gordon M. Myers, Redistribution Within and Across 
the Regions of a Federation, 27 CANADIAN J. ECON. 620, 629 (1994). Their model 
focuses in particular on the labor mobility assumption. (Pauly’s model, like 
Tiebot’s, had made the simplifying assumption that individuals do not work.) 
 69. Brooks, supra note 49, at 105–07 (discussing the implications of state 
fiscal institutions including balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure 
limitations, and rainy-day funds); See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005) (highlighting various structural biases 
in state constitutional structures and arguing, among other things, that states 
should revise their fiscal constitutions to take account of recessions). 
 70. Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1068 
(1980). See also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal 
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 399–435 (1990). 
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local governments are, in practice, able to achieve a 
significant amount of redistribution.71 
Because these arguments stand out within the local 
government literature as important exceptions from the 
consensus that municipalities are unable to effectively 
achieve redistribution, it is worth noting here what leads 
these authors to their unorthodox conclusions. As described 
above, much of the case that has been made for centralization 
hinges on the presumed or asserted impossibility of local 
redistribution. That is, the theoretical arguments have not 
generally been made in reference to any particular benefit of 
centralization on its own terms—but rather as something of 
a default, given the combination of 1) an observed political 
desire to achieve redistribution, and 2) the constraints placed 
on local governments by mobile residents. 
Gillette pushes back against the orthodoxy he 
summarizes by identifying several reasons why 
redistribution has, for some time, been “a staple of local 
government.”72 The asserted effect of each reason he 
discusses is to dull, in some way, the market-like forces of 
citizen mobility that Buchanan and others had identified.73 
For example, he discusses the ways that agglomeration 
economies—economic returns available by virtue of 
geographic proximity to others—might constrain the location 
decisions of both firms and residents, such that their 
responsiveness to imposed tax extractions might fall 
somewhere short of perfect.74 He notes that members of a 
 
 71. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text for a discussion on 
presumed or asserted impossibility in local redistribution. 
 72. Gillette, supra note 16, at 1060 (noting that, according to 2001 Census 
figures, about seven percent of all municipal direct expenditures went towards 
unreimbursed direct expenditures for public welfare and health care). 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. Id. at 1057 (“The market for residence . . . will be distorted by the same 
agglomeration economies that induce firms to remain within a particular 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that it would prefer that all those within its 
network migrate to some alternative jurisdiction. Exit will only occur if the costs 
related to exploitation exceed the significant costs related to emigration.”). 
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community might plausibly support some level of “benign” 
redistribution to others in their community, even in excess of 
their own returns.75 
Discussing the political dynamics of redistributive 
policy, Gillette has also argued that local redistribution 
“typically entails the transfer of relatively small amounts 
from a large number of individuals to a smaller group of 
beneficiaries, each of whom receives a significant benefit.”76 
But as economic inequality rises, the nature of 
redistribution—where it occurs at all—will tend to shift. To 
the extent that wealth is concentrated among a few 
superearners, the model Gillette describes, where the many 
transfer to the poorer few, will no longer be available; 
resources for redistribution will either come from the few 
superearners or they will not be available.77 
Another recent account, from John Brooks, makes a 
similar argument, applied to tax policy.78 He discusses recent 
empirical work showing that an individual’s mobility 
response to local redistributive tax and spending policies is 
often relatively muted, and varies across demographics and 
other factors.79 From this result, he proposes separating the 
insurance function of income taxation—the function of 
smoothing receipts across the business cycle, which should 
be retained by the central authority—from its redistributive 
function, which he argues can safely be untaken by state 
governments without risking taxpayer flight.80 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1065. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Brooks, supra note 49. 
 79. Id. at 90–91. 
 80. Id. at 142 (“The relevant costs, at least within the range of plausible 
current policies, are not from tax migration and crippling state tax competition 
as a result of redistributive policies, but rather from poor risk management—
suboptimal insurance against income shocks, both for states and their 
residents.”). 
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Notably, both of these authors ground their arguments 
in the existence of mobility constraints—the various reasons 
why residential mobility is something short of perfect—
which supports their findings that local redistribution can be 
achieved. As generally theorized, the relationship is inverse: 
as mobility increases (approaching perfect responsiveness), 
the amount of redistribution that can be achieved at the local 
level declines. Evidence that location decisions are highly 
sensitive to benefit spillover undermines, in this model, the 
case for local redistribution; evidence that location decisions 
are determined by other factors makes local redistribution 
more attractive. 
As such, many of the arguments “against” centralized 
redistribution have adopted the limited formulation that 
redistribution can happen at the local level, rather than 
making a positive case that this the preferable design.81 
Support for this proposition, where it can be found, tends to 
come not from the academic literature but from political 
actors who take a dim view of redistribution as a policy goal. 
For example, columnist David Brooks recently wrote that 
“[c]onservatives tend to like their [income] redistribution 
done at the local level”82 and many Republican policy 
proposals—like converting entitlement programs into state-
level block grants—implicitly adopt this recommendation, 
even where it is not argued in these terms.83 
 
 81. See Brooks, supra note 49, at 112 (“It may be that some limited state role 
in redistribution—perhaps close to what states are currently doing—is 
appropriate, and may even be optimal.”). But see Gillette, supra note 16, at 1121 
(“The conventional wisdom that local redistributive programs will encourage exit 
to localities that impose only benefit-based taxes . . . ignores the spatial benefits 
of redistribution that may make local programs efficient and effective.”). 
 82. David Brooks, The G.O.P. Rejects Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/opinion/the-gop-rejects-conservatis 
m.html?ref=opinion&_r=0. 
 83. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, The Proglem with Block-granting 
Entitlement Programs, CBPP.org, https://www.cbpp.org/the-problems-with-
block-granting-entitlement-programs (last visited May 22, 2019). 
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D. School Finance Equity 
Throughout this theoretical literature, mobility is the 
key variable that determines the availability of local 
redistribution: as location decisions become more elastic with 
respect to benefit spillover, the attractiveness of centralizing 
redistribution increases. But in the applied literature, other 
inputs have received greater attention. In particular, 
scholarship on education in the United States has devoted 
significant attention to the implications of resource 
inequality across geographies.84 Indeed, perhaps the central 
conclusion of the scholarship on school funding inequality is 
that economic segregation leads to less redistribution and 
the need for higher rates of taxation in poor towns. 
Education is a classic example of the class of “impure” 
public good described above, including elements of 
redistribution as well as benefit to the financer. In the 
United States, as noted above, primary schools are largely 
financed by locally assessed property taxes—though with 
significant redistributive inter-district transfers from the 
higher levels of government, especially through the federal 
government’s Title I program. Over the past several decades, 
courts have made municipal boundaries crucial 
determinants of the availability of education, even as they 
have rejected challenges to the exclusion of low-income 
people from many affluent communities.85 In that same 
 
 84. See Liscow, supra note 32, at 1837–38 (reviewing this literature and 
noting that, in the local education context, “the dominant critique [of the Tiebout 
model] has been the stark inequalities associated with decentralized funding”). 
See also Reynolds, supra note 45, at 375 (“[T]he current legal system has made it 
possible for affluent suburbs to capture wealth and impose costs on other parts 
of metropolitan areas, most importantly through the exercise of zoning powers, 
taxation powers, and school funding systems.”). 
 85. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (refusing to allow 
federal court to order cross-district school desegregation remedy despite finding 
of intentional discrimination by the state that chartered those suburbs); see also 
San Antonio Indep. Schl. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 55–59 (1973) (rejecting 
equal protection challenge to vast disparities in school financing based on local 
property values). 
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period, scholars and advocates have observed that 
decentralized systems of education finance will tend to limit 
the quality of education received in poor school districts, 
despite the residents’ bearing a significantly greater tax 
burden than their wealthier neighbors. On this basis, many 
legal scholars have argued that the equal provision of 
educational opportunity requires some form of fiscal 
centralization.86 
Some of this literature has discussed the sort of 
competitive pressures deriving from residential mobility that 
Tiebout and Buchanan identified.87 But scholars also have 
recognized that the existence of economic segregation across 
geographies raises the stakes of the centralization debate 
even on a static basis. As Richard Briffault has observed, 
“local financial control contributes to inequality in the 
provision of local education . . . [by] dividing states into 
districts of radically different taxable wealth, making the 
quality of local services dependent upon the amount of local 
wealth.”88 Notably, the local government literature has in 
this context highlighted constraints on mobility—in 
 
 86. Liscow, supra note 32, at 1839 (“[C]entralization advocates argue that, 
with a decentralized finance system, it is not the differences in tastes but rather 
the differences in income that drive differences in spending between jurisdictions, 
with severe consequences for inequality.”). 
 87. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 229–232 
(2001); Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 
CONN. L. REV. 773, 805 (1992) (“In contemporary metropolitan areas, local 
financial responsibility encourages residents dissatisfied with the quality of 
education in their community to take the Tiebout solution and ‘exit’ to 
communities with the resources and programs to provide the desired educational 
services, rather than loyally remain in their old communities . . . .”); Isaac Bayoh 
et al., Determinants of Residential Location Choice: How Important Are Local 
Public Goods in Attracting Homeowners to Central City Locations, 46 J. REGIONAL 
SCI. 97, 99 (2006). 
 88. Briffault, supra note 87, at 805–06 (“Local financial responsibility . . . both 
reflects and contributes to interlocal wealth disparities by creating fiscal 
incentives for the economic and political fragmentation of metropolitan areas, 
[and] reducing the taxable resources of less affluent communities . . . .”); Liscow, 
supra note 32, at 1830–31 (“When funding is decentralized, and local 
communities pay for their own services, the wealth of the community becomes a 
key determinant in how much a community can pay for services like schools.”). 
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particular, successful efforts of affluent communities to 
exclude low-income families with children—as justification 
for greater centralization of this particular mixed public 
good. This is remarkable, considering that the theoretical 
case for redistributive centralization is frequently justified in 
reference to the competitive pressures created by high 
degrees of residential mobility. This inconsistency within the 
leading accounts of fiscal federalism might naturally suggest 
that models of fiscal federalism omit an important variable—
or at the very least overemphasize residential mobility—but 
this tension has not previously been recognized. 
IV. THE CENTRAL DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL ARE NOT 
SENSITIVE TO DIFFERENT RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Does mobility matter at all, then? Particularly given its 
central role in previous models, it should be acknowledged 
that all of the scenarios described in Part II assume away 
mobility; the models are static, and the residents of this 
political community do not respond to these changes in the 
way that the literature predicts they will. In particular, this 
analysis implicitly assumes the existence of some constraints 
on the ability of poor people (the left-behinds) to simply move 
to the resource-rich jurisdiction (Unit A). This is an 
important limitation, because—as discussed above—in a 
world without any constraints on their mobility, poor people 
will naturally tend to move to the wealthier jurisdictions. To 
the extent that this is true, it will provide a countervailing 
pull on this theoretical relationship between inequality and 
geographic segregation, and thus also between fiscal 
splintering and redistribution. (Of course, as just described, 
the fiscal federalism literature suggests that the case for 
decentralizing redistribution becomes stronger as mobility 
declines—but it should be noted here that this simplifying 
assumption limits the model.) What are the consequences of 
this simplification? 
The most obvious objection concerns the left-behinds. I 
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noted in the previous section that this group clearly loses 
from fiscal splintering. The effect of economic inequality 
means that a greater share of total resources will be located 
outside of these left-behind districts. This is mathematically 
true whether or not these individuals are concentrated 
geographically, provided that fiscal units are drawn such 
that some number of individuals is excluded from the 
resource-rich jurisdictions.89 To the extent that the 
superearners will seek to live near other similarly-wealthy 
individuals, the effects will be magnified. If these 
superearners are additionally able to exclude individuals 
who have fewer financial resources—if they are able to 
enforce their enclaving through political or practical 
means—then the relationship will be stronger still. 
But it may be argued that the number of these “left-
behind” residents will in practice likely be small, considering 
that over time the poor are likely to migrate towards the 
rich—such that the same geographic community will grow 
larger as a fiscal unit, because it will include both poor and 
rich. If the total amount of redistribution is held constant 
across time, then this fiscal splintering also creates winners: 
poor families who share a fiscal unit with the superearners 
now may enjoy the benefit of these resources without sharing 
with those other poor families who remain outside the unit. 
Because people are mobile to some degree, we cannot 
know with certainty how large the share of the population 
that will remain in these categories is—that is an empirical 
question that lies beyond the scope of this Essay. But there 
are reasons to believe that constraints on mobility do exist, 
and those constraints will limit the ability of the left-behinds 
to simply move to the superearners’ fiscal unit. As long as 
some number are left behind—and thus “walled off” from the 
 
 89. In the absence of perfect mobility, rising inequality leads to greater 
economic segregation. This is true because even if every poor person were to 
follow the superearners, the community would still have a geographic 
concentration of wealth, and it would now also have a geographic concentration 
of poverty. This simply describes a geographic concentration of people. 
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superearners’ wealth—we can state with certainty that fiscal 
splintering will tend to increase inequality post-
redistribution, as compared to a centralized regime. 
Although the strength of this relationship (between economic 
segregation and redistributive outcomes) will be affected by 
a number of factors, this Essay shows that the direction of 
this relationship does not require qualification. 
It is true that, at the margin, poor people will tend to 
migrate to cash-rich communities: this is a central conclusion 
of the federalism literature, and there is some empirical 
support for the proposition. Studies estimating migration 
effects of welfare programs characterized by inter-state 
benefit variation policies have ranged from finding no tax 
migration effect at all to a comparatively high degree of 
responsiveness.90 But even the studies finding the highest 
degree of responsiveness—a result that, it should again be 
noted, federalism scholars typically would consider evidence 
for centralizing redistribution91—show that mobility is short 
of perfect. 
This is, in part, because poor families, like everyone else, 
are attached to their communities for reasons separate from 
the tax and transfer system. But beyond those factors, 
wealthy communities have a variety of legal and practical 
 
 90. See Kathleen M. Day & Stanley L. Winer, Policy-Induced Internal 
Migration: An Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case, 13 INT’L TAX & PUB. 
FIN. 535, 535–36 (2006) (finding, in over twenty years of Canadian tax data, little 
migration based on interstate policy differences in the generosity of 
unemployment insurance); Robert Kaestner, Neeraj Kaushal & Gregg Van Ryzin, 
Migration Consequences of Welfare Reform, 53 J. URB. ECON. 357, 358–59 (2003); 
Phillip B. Levine & David J. Zimmerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare 
Magnet Debate Using the NLSY, 12 J. POPULATION ECON. 391, 407 (1999). Others 
have demonstrated empirically that local governments can use income taxes to 
redistribute wealth without significant migration effects. See Timothy J. 
Goodspeed, A Re-Examination of the Use of Ability to Pay Taxes by Local 
Governments, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 319, 340 (1989). 
 91. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 49, at 112 (“If it is difficult for taxpayers to 
move, and if there are factors that outweigh taxation (such as jobs, family, 
culture, and the like), then states actually may have some room for redistribution 
with little repercussion.”). 
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tools that can be used to exclude.92 Even if the effect of these 
measures is imperfect, they do have a real effect on 
residential mobility; indeed, this is a central finding in the 
thread of literature responding to Tiebout.93 David 
Schleicher has shown that rates of inter-state mobility are 
low particularly among disadvantaged groups, despite a 
growing connection between moving and economic 
opportunity.94 To the extent that people are unable to move, 
for whatever reason, then some number will be unable to 
escape their cash-poor communities for the greener pastures 
of the wealthy fiscal units. 
But even if no constraints on mobility existed and every 
left-behind determined her residence via a single-variable 
calculus that maximized redistributive transfers,95 this does 
not undermine the existence of the relationship identified 
here. Recall that I have defined the fiscal units in reference 
to population size. Were all residents of the community to be 
perfectly responsive to redistributive outcomes, this would 
simply mean that, over the long run, fiscal units are always 
maximally large—that they never vary in size at all, because 
the poor will simply follow the superearners. That might be 
true in a theoretical model that doesn’t include any 
geographic “stickiness” (that is, under conditions of perfect 
mobility and responsiveness), but we know that it does not 
describe the real world. Under this extreme assumption, the 
 
 92. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 931, 935–41 (2010). 
 93. See Pierre Salmon, Horizontal Competition Among Governments, in 
HANDBOOK OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 69 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds., 
2006) (“[The high cost of moving] is often considered a decisive objection to 
models—like the Tiebout model or the Oates and Schwab model (1988)—that are 
dependent on the assumption of mobility.”). 
 94. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential 
Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 78 (2017) (“People are not leaving areas hit by 
economic crises, with unemployment rates and low wages lingering in these areas 
for decades. And people are not moving to rich regions where the highest wages 
are available.”). 
 95. This is an admittedly extreme assumption, but it underlies many forms of 
Tieboutian reasoning described above. 
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most that can be said is that there is no relationship between 
inequality and economic segregation—not that the 
relationship goes the other way, but just that in practice it 
will tend to be small.96 
That is to say, the existence of mobility does not defeat 
the argument that economic inequality is linked to 
geospatial segregation—it merely reduces the strength of the 
relationship. Even the strongest form of this argument is 
that rising individual inequality does not necessarily lead to 
rising inequality in geographic space—it just very likely does 
so. But note what is required for this to not be true. It 
requires that every single poor person follow the 
superearners. If even one is left behind, then the relationship 
is descriptively correct. In other words, this criticism in its 
strongest form is about the strength rather than the existence 
of this relationship. 
That is, the central recommendation of the model holds 
as long as mobility is not both perfect (every individual has 
the ability to relocate, and no barriers are allowed), and 
perfectly responsive to these changes (every individual 
actually does relocate on this basis). We know that the world 
does not look like this. In reality, the poor often face practical 
boundaries to relocation; the rich have a variety of legal and 
practical mechanisms that can be used to exclude, and even 
perfectly mobile people will sometimes choose factors—like 
proximity to family or the availability of work—that lead 
them to reside in a community other than the one that would 
maximize their potential receipt of redistribution or public 
services. 
 
 96. Moreover, this counterargument is actually consistent with my broader 
point. The only way to argue that this relationship is not true is to suggest that, 
as a result of mobility, the fiscal unit will include both the superearners and all 
of the poor. But the point of my argument is that we should ensure that this 
happens. If this already is happening—and again, there is plenty of evidence that 
it is not—then it does not undermine my argument, it simply limits its 
applicability to cases where mobility is imperfect. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Many have missed the deep implications of economic 
inequality for core tenants of fiscal federalism. This 
framework shows that debates about the proper assignment 
of redistribution assume a different character depending on 
the preexisting level of inequality within the political 
community. Specifically, economic inequality raises the 
stakes of “fiscal splintering” for redistributive outcomes and 
possibilities: where economic resources are unevenly 
distributed across geography, the spatial definition of fiscal 
units takes on great significance. And the presence of 
economic inequality places a ceiling on local governments’ 
ability to provide public goods or achieve redistribution, 
absent centrally-coordinated fiscal transfers. 
Traditional models of fiscal federalism overlook this 
important relationship. Orthodox models of decentralization 
argue that location-mobility of residents is a disciplining 
measure for local governments. The consensus view is that 
mobility limits the ability of local governments to achieve 
redistribution, because high-income people will exit when it 
is attempted.97 Others point to evidence showing that 
locations decisions are relatively inelastic to support their 
conclusion that redistribution can happen at the local level.98 
I show that this debate does not need to be settled in order 
to conclude that rising levels of economic inequality support 
moving redistribution to higher levels of governance. 
Just as scholars have argued that the competitive forces 
of residential mobility have the effect of making local 
redistribution impossible, these examples suggest that—on 
a static basis—high levels of inequality will tend to have the 
same effect. So as long as there are some constraints on 
mobility, then it can be said—without qualification—that 
rising inequality will always and necessarily have the effect 
 
 97. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 98. See supra Section III.C. 
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of increasing the geographic clustering of resources. This 
follows mathematically from the fact that inequality is 
defined as an increasing concentration of economic resources 
across a population, and that people are indivisible economic 
units—they exist at only one place in time. And to the extent 
that economic resources are unevenly spread across a 
political community, then the exercise of line drawing—of 
determining the size and placement of the fiscal units—
becomes increasingly important as a determinant of the 
practical availability of inter-unit economic redistribution. 
For public finance scholars, the predominant policy 
response to the trend of economic stratification has been to 
increase the burden of taxation on very high-wealth 
individuals.99 But as the model supporting this framework 
demonstrates, the case for centralizing redistribution 
depends in large part on the level of economic inequality in a 
polity—and is thus greatly strengthened by rising 
inequality. The significant implications of this basic 
relationship have not been fully explored. Service devolution 
to lower, smaller geographic units has been praised for 
various virtues according to America’s favorite versions of 
democratic theory.100 But under a set of straightforward 
assumptions, these structures will also have the inevitable 
effect of deepening inequality and making the efficient 
provision of public services less likely. As a policy matter, it 
suggests that we should focus on either increasing the size of 
fiscal units of redistribution to include ultra-wealthy or 
alternatively shifting the site of redistribution to the circle 
that is large enough to include both the haves and the have-
nots. 
 
 99. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and 
Policy Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7, 7 (2017); Emmanuel Saez, 
Questions and Answers: Income and Wealth Inequality—Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 26, 26–28 (2017). 
 100. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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I argue here that on policy matters involving some 
element of redistribution—that is, almost everything the 
government does—fiscal decentralization, under the 
background condition of economic segregation, will always 
result in increased inequality, compared to centralized 
redistribution. The existence of rising income inequality thus 
provides support for shifting the site of revenue collection to 
higher levels of government as a general policy, even as 
decision-making may be retained at local levels. This 
conclusion represents the opposite direction of recent policy 
debates, which have proposed sharply curbing or even 
eliminating federal support to states and local governments. 
The federal government can easily capture the 
tremendous wealth that our economy produces, no matter 
how it is distributed over geographic space within the 
country. From this basic insight, we can both better 
understand the shortcomings of the current system and also 
make specific recommendations for reform. Instead of 
devolving the financing of public investments—whether 
schools or courts or infrastructure—to ill-equipped cities and 
states, the federal government should respond to rising 
economic inequality by assuming responsibility for their 
funding. 
